The literature on the evolution of impatience, focusing on one-person decision problems, finds that evolutionary forces favor the more patient individuals. This paper shows that in the context of a game, this is not necessarily the case. In particular, it offers a twopopulation example where evolutionary forces favor impatience in one group while favoring patience in the other. Moreover, not only evolution but also efficiency may prefer impatient individuals. In our example, it is efficient for one population to evolve impatience and for the other to develop patience. Yet, evolutionary forces move the wrong populations. 1 We thank Fernando Vega-Redondo, Ramon Marimon and participants at the EUI Microeconomics working group for helpful comments. We are grateful to NSF grant SES-03-14713 for financial support.
Introduction
Why are we often more impulsive than we might like to be? To take one of many examples: although the "cost" of getting a copy of a new book or the last model of a computer decreases substantially with time, few people choose to wait. Moreover, in some cases there are people that spend the night in line to be the first buyers. From the perspective of evolution this poses a puzzle: evolution favors the very long run. Given the great variation in patience and self-control in the population, will not evolutionary forces favor those more willing to wait? Should we not evolve towards ever-greater patience and absence of impulsivity? Indeed, Blume and Easley [1992] and more recently Bottazzi and Dindo [2011] 2 show in the context of a wealth accumulation problem that evolution favors the patient so strongly that it favors the patient over the smart.
One explanation is the natural explanation, for example by Chowdhry
[forthcoming] that we are impatient because we may not live to see tomorrow. However this does not in itself explain why we should evolve impatience: even a very patient individual will behave impatiently in the face of uncertain life.
Here we explore an alternative explanation of the evolution of impatience. In an investment problem short-sightedness is dysfunctional. The same is not true in a game.
Preferences can act as a form of commitment device. For example, a reputation for laziness is very desirable in order to avoid requests for referee reports or letters of recommendation. In a repeated game an impatient player can not be threatened with future punishment, and so is harder to exploit.
The idea of impatience as commitment is a subtle one. Successful commitmentas lovers of Dr. Strangelove will know -requires two elements: credibility and publicity.
Evolutionary forces by building impatience into preferences makes impatient behavior credible. But how does this help against an opponent that cannot directly observe preferences? Certainly it is reasonable that preferences might be inferred from past behavior -but then there is an incentive even for a patient player to build a reputation for impatience, and it is not so clear why evolution would favor the inflexibility of commitment over the flexibility of pretense. Moreover, it is interesting to note that pretense requires patience to work. Building a reputation is something that an impatient player would not choose to do. The patient can mimic an impatient, but the impatient will not mimic anyone.
To attack this issue, we make the simplifying assumption that a player's play is observed only at the end of his life. This eliminates any incentive for a patient player to mimic an impatient player. Why then would evolution favor impatience over patience?
The answer is that while the player does not gain fitness from being impatient, his children do. The player herself does not care about this, only about her own utility given her patience. Evolutionary selection on the other hand is highly dependent on the consequences of parental action for the children. If other players are able to infer a player's patience ex post from his play, if they can observe who her children are, and if they understand that patience is hereditary -then children potentially benefit from the parent's impatience.
We explore these issues in the context of a simple game designed to illustrate both how impatience can emerge as an evolutionary outcome and also to understand how different social roles may result in different degrees of patience. Indeed despite anecdotal evidence -the behavior of Charles Sheen comes to mind -that the rich may be as impulsive as the poor there is statistical evidence, for example in Cunha and Heckman [2009] that there is a strong connection between economically unsuccessful families and impatience and lack of self-control.
This paper is designed to further advance the literature on the evolution of preferences. The evolution of altruism has been much studied, for example, in Bowles [2001] . They have been studied in the context of cultural evolution by Bisin and Topa [2004] and the broader issue of cultural versus other forms of transmission have been studied by Bisin [2001] . Other deep issues about kinship and selection have been examined by Alger and Weibull [2010] . Authors such as Ely [2001] and Dekel, Ely and Yilankaya [2007] have examined the theoretical underpinings of evolutionary equilibrium when preferences evolve, relating evolutionary outcomes to equilibria of the fitness game. However the evolution of impatience (as opposed to patience) has not been much studied.
There are a variety of subtle issues about impulsive behavior and self-control that have been explored in the behavioral economics literature -see for example Fudenberg and Levine [2006] . However, we do not examine these issues of commitment, present bias and time consistency here -rather we focus on the simpler question of why intertemporal preferences with a low geometric discount factor might emerge in an evolutionary setting.
We also look at the inefficiency of equilibrium, which has a natural interpretation when the model is viewed as a buyer-seller model. On this we elaborate in the conclusions.
In all the above-mentioned cases, the gains from impatience are private. However, there are also cases in which there are social gains from impatience. An example of this is provided in the literature on conflict. 3 In this literature people can satisfy their desires either by producing or by appropriating others' production (that is, through conflict). In general, resources spent in conflict are a social waste. Thus, it is best for society that people do not engage in appropriation by conflict; as a second best, it is best that those who do it be more impatient, so that they do not invest much in technologies that are detrimental to social welfare. This is an extreme case that can be explained in our model.
An alternative, less extreme case, is for example, is the case of speculators. They could have a social function, namely helping the alignment of prices, yet they do appropriate part of the gains from investments.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. In Section 2 we develop the model.
In Section 3 we analyze the equilibrium of the evolutionary process. In Section 4 we discuss efficiency issues. Finally, we conclude in Section 5.
The Model
There is a continuum of players divided into two populations, Farmers who constitute a fraction φ of the population and Sheriffs who are the other 1 φ − of the population. Each round Farmers and Sheriffs are randomly matched where the probability of a meeting between a Farmer and a Sheriff is 2 (1 ) φ φ − . The remaining Farmers and Sheriffs are unmatched. All players have an initial endowment of one bushel of wheat, and fitness is linear in wheat.
3 See Hirshleifer [1991] . Rent seeking is a particularly interesting special case of conflict that has received much attention at least since Tullock [1967] and Krueger [1974] .
A round consists of either a one-person or two-person game that has three periods.
Unmatched Farmer [Investment Game]:
Period 1: invest Farmers are socially productive in the sense that they can make investments resulting in an increase in wheat. However Sheriffs can appropriate some of the output of Farmers. In this sense the model has a predator-prey flavor. Notice, however, that the model is formulated so that there is no intrinsic distortion in the predation: the amount that the Sheriffs can appropriate is independent of how much is produced by Farmers. The predation takes place through threat of punishment: Farmers must choose whether or not to comply with the Sheriffs' demands. If Farmers fail to comply with the demand of the Sheriff then they are punished. The level of punishment depends on the investment made by the Sheriff. Notice that there is no commitment issue for the Sheriff: the more patient they are the more they will invest in punishment -and as we will see Sheriffs will evolve towards a high degree of patience. Notice that the output from the match accrues to the Farmer, not the Sheriff. Here the model becomes one of potentially beneficial trade -but the only mechanism the Sheriff has for appropriating some of the gains to trade is by threatening the Farmer.
Unfortunately this mechanism is not related to the gain to trade: the amount the Sheriff can appropriate does not depend on how good the match is. This captures a situation that sometimes occurs in practice: if one party owns the enforcement mechanism, why not appropriate the most that can be appropriated rather than some sort of amount determined by efficiency considerations? Why should a large politically connected monopolist merely appropriate what the market is willing to pay, when they can have a nice piece of tax revenue to go with it?
One interpretation when 0 G > is that the Sheriffs are buyers and the Farmers sellers, the amount of wheat provided to the Sheriff/buyer represents the quality of a product and G the gains to trade. Here the Farmer/sellers have an incentive to cheat the Sheriff/buyers -and the only recourse that the Sheriff/buyers have is to retaliate against a Farmer/seller who provides low quality. Hence the quality provided will be in proportion to the ability of the Sheriff/buyer to punish the Farmer/seller. In a sense this provides the opposite from the case where 0 G = : in that case the Sheriffs are parasites. In the buyer/seller context they are buyers who may receive too little share of the surplus to provide them with adequate incentives.
Equilibrium

Equilibrium of a Match
We turn now to studying subgame perfect equilibria of the different matches.
First, and this is a critical point, information about a player's strategy becomes public only after the match ends, at which point the player dies and does not play again, so the only consideration a player has is utility received during the match given preferences.
In the investment game the objective function for the Farmer is 1
the first order condition is In the Farmer-Sheriff game the objective function of the Farmer is
Notice that this is rigged so that the optimal investment choice of the Farmer is independent of F d , whether or not there is punishment, the Farmer's beliefs and is the same as when the Farmer is unmatched:
Notice that more impatient Farmers produce less so are potentially less fit than more patient Farmers.
Hence it is by no means a foregone conclusion that evolutionary forces will favor the less patient Farmer.
In choosing how much to pay, clearly the Farmer should choose either 0
, whichever is larger -again regardless of beliefs.
The optimal play of the Sheriff depends on his beliefs. As this will be the case we make use of, we solve only for the case in which these beliefs are a point mass F δ . Then the Sheriff should choose the largest demand consistent with payment:
The (believed) utility of the Sheriff is then 1
by the Sheriff to maximize his utility, so that
The amount demanded by the Sheriff is an increasing function of both the discount factor of the Sheriff -since a patient Sheriff will invest more -and the (believed) discount factor of the Farmer -since a patient Farmer is more susceptible to a threat.
Notice that the true beliefs of the Farmer are irrelevant to this equilibrium. At the end of the match, the strategy of the Farmer is revealed, and in particular
, so that the discount factor can be inferred by inverting this function:
The Evolutionary Process: Two Types
We now wish to consider the co-evolution of preferences as measured by the discount factors and the number of Farmers and Sheriffs. In the analysis overall fitness of a particular population does not depend on preferences, but on the total, undiscounted expected utility over the life of the individual.
5
For simplicity we consider first the case where there are two possible preferences: either patient preferences with discount factor one -corresponding to maximizing the same total fitness objective function as evolutionary fitness -or impatient preferences with
In this simple model there are four types of individuals: patient Farmers, patient Sheriffs, impatient Farmers and impatient Sheriffs. At the end of each round each group gives birth to offspring who are identical in preferences and type: offspring are commonly observed. Since beliefs going into a round are fixed no player has any incentive to do other than maximize with respect to his true preferences; as we observed above this means at the end of a round players' preferences can be inferred from behavior, so the preferences of offspring are known with certainty -and equal to their true value. In this context: why should not evolution simply favor patient players as they maximize fitness. The reason for this is that individuals simply maximize with respect to their own preferences and do not take account of how this will effect subsequent 5 A few words may be useful about fitness. Fitness is meant to be what evolution favors, and it is not utility. Take a simple example: there are two people. One is miserable in a solid brick house and the other is happy in the woods. The morning after a freezing night the first guy is, as always, unhappily complaining over his coffee, but the second is dead. The former are preferences, the latter is fitness. Fitness is an objective measure independent of preferences and is in general an elusive concept. In our case, however, preferences only enter as discount factors, hence removing them yields the desired measure of fitness.
generations. In particular, for fixed Sheriff beliefs it is costly in fitness for an individual
Farmer to maximize with respect to a discount factor less than one. However, by doing so, she (involuntarily) establishes that her offspring are impatient -and this means that subsequent Sheriffs will demand less from her offspring. While the impatient Farmer loses through her impatience, her offspring benefit, and this creates a potential evolutionary force towards impatience.
Recall 
while in the Farmer-Sheriff game it is
The fitness of an unmatched sheriff is one, while in the Farmer-Sheriff game it is
Our model of evolution is the standard replicator dynamics based on evolutionary fitness. If j φ is the population fraction of group j , j V is the fitness of the group and V is the average fitness of the population, then
Our analysis is greatly aided by the observation that Sheriffs evolve strictly towards greater patience:
The interesting case in the long-run, therefore, has only three types: patient Sheriffs, and both patient and impatient Farmers. In this case, on which we now focus, we can compute the overall fitnesses of a (patient) Sheriff to be
while that of Farmers is given by
Notice that this depends on how many farmers there are, but not, of course, what type they are. The replicator dynamics can now be summarized by two equations: 
Notice that * φ does not depend on G . Notice also that the hypothesis 
so that if the impatient Farmers are less impatient there will be more of them at the steady state.
The key observation here is that at a stable interior steady state in the long-run there is a positive fraction of farmers who are impatient: evolution leads to impatience. 
The Evolutionary Process: Many Types
It is not very natural to suppose that the only possible preferences are given by two discount factors ,1 δ . Suppose instead that there are individuals with every discount factor in the interval
. The general case is intractable, but a simple approximation gives us insight into the dynamics and enables us to determine a steady state value of δ .
First observe that as with the case with two types, Sheriffs with 1 δ = always have higher fitness than those with lower discount factors, so in the long run the Sheriffs will evolve towards patience. As before, the interesting case is where there is a single group of patient Sheriffs, and we will focus on this case.
Next suppose that there is a density function over discount factors δ ψ and that we are near an interior steady state, the case of interest. Then as the steady state is approached the density function must approach a spike as every type of Farmer evolves towards the optimal discount factor. The replicator dynamic is given by
where F V is the mean fitness of farmers. Since the distribution of types is very concentrated near the mean value F δ we may introduce an approximation. First, we may approximate the mean fitness F V by the fitness F V evaluated at the mean discount factor
[ ]
After a short interval of time τ the system will evolve according to
We can then compute the mean discount factor by integrating: 
The fact that the variance 2 σ is time varying does not matter for our stability analysis, so we hold it fixed, and study the dynamic equation
which is simply the continuous time best response dynamic -that is the mean moves in the direction of increasing fitness. The dynamics of φ are the replicator dynamic, now based on the mean discount factor, so 
and for sufficiently large
Proof: In Appendix B.
Efficiency and the Impatience Trap
We now turn to the issue of welfare. Our measure of welfare is the average fitness for the whole population. Our goal is to show how an inefficient impatience trap arises in which the wrong population becomes impatient.
To compute the average fitness of the entire population, observe that: there is a sheriffs who share a total fitness of
. Therefore expected average fitness is 
We think of the social planner as choosing a distribution over discount factors for Farmers and Sheriffs, ( ) ( )
respectively (which may and in fact will be Dirac delta functions), and what fraction φ of the population is assigned the role of a Farmer, in order to maximize fitness. In turn, each individual chooses his optimal level of investment. Since the planner is constrained to choose discount factors, we refer to this as the second best.
Theorem 5:
The second best distribution is given by 
In terms of investments, fitness is given by:
Given that fitness is strictly decreasing in S k , the optimal distribution assigns point mass to the value of S δ which implements 0 (1
which is maximized as asserted.
The intuition for the optimal discount factors is simple: Sheriffs' investments are a social waste, which they would not do if they become extremely impatient. On the other hand, Farmers are productive, and they would choose the optimal investment if they were extremely patient. In fact, in the language of Hirshleifer Sheriffs obtain their wealth through conflict; in the language of Tullock and Krueguer, Sheriffs are rent-seekers. In contrast, Farmers obtain their wealth through production.
As for the optimal fraction of Farmers, it is less than 1 because there is a social gain of G whenever a Farmer and a Sheriff meet. The fraction of the matched population is maximized at
In the spirit of the rent seeking literature this is saying that societies, optimally, would have rent seekers only if when matched to productive agents they were to increase "social output" (that is, 0 G > ). Otherwise, if 0 G = , it would be optimal not to have rent seekers.
A related question has to do with the optimal mix of Farmers and Sheriffs when the social planner does not choose their discount factors, but instead when they are at their equilibrium values. The first order condition for this constrained maximization problem gives { } 1 1 2 2 min 1, 
In this interpretation, the final result of Theorem 4 says that if the gains to trade
G are large enough increasing the effectiveness of punishment will raise the steady state number of Sheriff/Buyers, thus reducing inefficiency. We will come back on this point in the conclusions.
Extensions
In all our analysis we have focused in a particular sequence of the game. Now we discuss the results under alternative sequences of the game.
In the equilibrium analysis of the model there is a "non-standard" result, namely, that in a bargaining situation being impatient might be better. Usually we get the opposite result (for example, Rubinstein's model). The reason for this has to do with the structure of the game. Here, punishments are applied in the future and as such, a more patient Farmer is more influentiable by threats, weakening his bargaining position to the advantage of Sheriffs that get paid more. In contrast, in Rubinstein's model being more patient means that the cost associated to the delay to reach an agreement is smaller, strengthening the bargaining position.
7 When the second order condition does not hold (that is 0
Under the current game structure (namely, F k and S k are chosen after a meeting is produced, with the knowledge of the opponent's type) we can distinguish two effects: would have a lower expected utility implying a higher equilibrium φ . This would also be the case if the Sheriff were to make his investment decision before knowing if he would be matched or not, although admittedly resulting in an even lower fitness.
If the Sheriff makes both, his investment decision and his demand before knowing his opponent's F δ , both effects go away. Besides not obtaining the effect we want, this
case is also cumbersome to analyze because in equilibrium there would be demands that are not accepted by the more impatient farmers.
Both effects would also disappear if the punishment were to take place in period 2 rather than in period 3. Indeed, the discount factor affects the relationship between promised punishment and willingness to accept demands exclusively because punishments are promised to happen at a future date.
Regarding the welfare, the results are independent on the sequence of the game.
The efficient distribution of , S φ δ and F δ is independent of the sequence. Moreover,
given the efficient distribution all the results are independent of the sequence.
There are alternative characterizations, and real world situations, where in games less patient people do better than patient people. For example, Blaydes [2004] uses a version of Fearon's [1998] model to explain the division of cartel profits within the OPEC. In the model there is a first step in which there is a bargaining that determines the payoffs of a static game that is infinitely repeated. To enforce the "efficient" outcome in the infinitely repeated game, more impatient players need a higher "static" payment.
Thus, impatience is also in this case a source of bargaining strength.
Conclusion
We have shown that impatience survives evolutionary forces when it keeps down punishment by the opponents. This is in contrast to the single-person investment context where (Blume and Easley, 1992 ) the patient beats the informed.
When interpreting the model as one of buyer and seller, where the Farmer is the Seller and the Sheriff is the Buyer, we see G as the long run gains of partnership, not fully exploited in equilibrium owing to the presence of too many impatient sellers.
To put this discussion in context, the underlying issue here is: What makes a good business environment? The most common, reasonable short answer is "competence and reliability." The model of this paper has something to say about reliability, which is another face of patience. A reliable business does not "take the money and run" meaning a reliable seller must be patient. In our model suppose that potential gains from trade G are large. Never the less the share that may be claimed by buyers in the form of S d may be limited. In an underdeveloped economy the cost of investing in punishing recalcitrant sellers in the face of resource constraints may be large. The result can be an evolutionary stable impatience trap, in which the equilibrium is inefficient and sellers have little money to run with because there are too few buyers to spoil.
Our Theorem 4 points to an instrument that can potentially be used to reduce inefficiency, namely raising the effectiveness of punishment in the hand of the buyers, the parameter B . This is not simple -it would indeed be not credible if it were. For B is often nothing but social pressure on the unreliable producers. Said otherwise, the problem is to raise awareness of the long run nature of the benefits of business, and this links unreliability to the other component of a good business environment -competence or education. In the way of prescriptions for development we are not uncovering something new. On the other hand the model seems to be the first to uncover the source of the problem's persistence: the inefficient equilibrium we have is not simply undone by evolutionary forces.
Appendix A: Proof of Theorem 2
From the text, the dynamical system is given by
From the fitnesses in the text, we can compute the fitness differences
(1 ) 
we can see that since 1 B ≥ the numerator of the RHS is smaller than the denominator implying 1 * 1 φ − < , so that * φ cannot be negative. We may also write the numerator of 1 * φ − as
We then compute Proof: Direct computation using the fitness differences.
Corollary A3: ( 
(1 ){ * * 
Proof: The characterization of * φ is in Lemma A1. For sufficiently small 0 ε > we can
The first condition from Lemma A4 for an interior steady state is 
Appendix B: Proof of Theorems 3 and 4
As in the model with two types we can compute the fitnesses
8 this enables us to write the dynamical system as
There is a unique interior steady state.
Proof: (1) = + (1 + )
Moreover g is the sum of a constant and two increasing functions, so it is increasing, and hence has a unique zero in (0,1).
Turning to f , we see that (0) f G = − < 0 ɶ and
there is at least one solution by continuity. To prove uniqueness, observe that
'(1) (
(1 ) (
The second derivative is
This is negative below (1 ) Theorem 4 now follows directly from Lemmas B3, B4 and B5.
